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Comments
SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION: A
REVITALIZED RELIEF FOR THE ALIEN
Suspension of deportation is one form of discretionary relief
available to a deportable alien. To be eligible for this relief, the
alien must prove, among other things, his continuous physical
presence in the United States for a specified time. This Comment
analyzes Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, which dealt with the ques-
tion whether a brief and temporary absence from the United
States interrupts continuous physical presence. The author also
discusses those factors which significantly affect continuous phys-
ical presence.
INTRODUCTION
Suspension of deportation is one remedy available to an alien
involved in a deportation proceeding.' Suspension of deportation
not only protects the alien from physical deportation, but also ad-
justs the alien's status to that of an "alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence."2 Because this remedy allows the alien to
legally remain in the United States, it is extremely valuable.3
1. Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976) [herein-
after cited as I. & N. Act]. See generally Roberts, The Exercise of Administrative
Discretion Under the Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DiNGo . REv. 144, 156-57 (1975).
2. 1. & N. Act § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976). See generally Comment, Sus-
pension of Deportation: Illusory Relief, 14 SAN DiEGo I. Rav. 229 (1976).
3. See Comment, Suspension of Deportation: Illusory Relief, 14 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 229, 231 (1976). 'The effect of a grant of suspension of deportation is to extin-
guish the existing grounds for deportation; they may not be invoked subsequently
to exclude or deport the alien (citing In re Paraskos, 10 L & N. Dec. 491, 492-93
(1964)). The alien's status is adjusted from deportable to 'lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.' " Id. at 233.
Other discretionary remedies, such as adjustment of status, L & N. Act § 245, 8
December 1980 Vol. 18 No. 1
Before an alien may obtain suspension of deportation, he must
establish 4 a prima facie case of eligibility.5 One of the elements of
a prima facie case is continuous physical presence in the United
States during a statutorily specified time period. 6 Occasionally, a
long-term resident alien is temporarily and briefly absent from
the United States during the statutory period. If the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) attempts to deport an alien sub-
sequent to such an absence, and the alien seeks suspension of de-
portation, the question presented is whether the brief and
temporary absence sufficiently interrupts the continuity of the
U.S.C. § 1255 (1976), or registry, id. § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (1976), permit the alien to
remain in the United States as a legal resident. Since these remedies do not re-
quire Congressional ratification of the discretionary grant of relief, they are pre-
ferred to suspension of deportation. See generally Gordon, The Need to Modernize
Our Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 24-25 (1975). But in circum-
stances where the preferred remedies are unavailable, suspension of deportation
may be the prime remedy protecting the alien from the harsh consequence of de-
portation. See 57 INTERPRETER RELEASES 76, 77 (1980): "Although no longer...
the preeminent mode of discretionary relief; . . .suspension of deportation re-
mains important for a small number of aliens for whom no other administrative
solution is available."
But of. 2 C. GORDON & IL ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 7.9(a) (4) (rev. ed. 1979): "Suspension of deportation no longer is as important as
it once was in the arsenal of discretionary remedies, since its impact is considera-
bly diminished by the expanded authority to grant adjustments of status."
4. The burden of proof is on the alien. See, e.g., Kam Ng v. Pilliod, 279 F.2d
207 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 860 (1961).
5. To establish a prima facie case, the alien must prove the existence of stat-
utorily required conditions, generally described as: a) the alien's continuous phys-
ical presence in the United States for a specified period, I. & N. Act § 244(a),(b), 8
U.S.C. § 1254(a), (b) (1976); b) his good morals during the specified period and at
the time of the hearing, id. § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976); see generally id.
§ 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1976); c) the extreme hardship to the alien or to his
spouse, parent, or child (or grandchild, Tovar v. INS, 612 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1980))
who is a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence that would result from deportation, id. § 244(a) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1)
(1976). (In other cases of more severe deportable misconduct, the alien must
show "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship." Id. § 244(a) (2), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254(a) (2) (1976)); d) the alien is not in a disqualified classification, id. § 244(f), 8
U.S.C. § 1254(f) (1976); see also 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 7.9(c) (rev. ed. 1979); 55 INTERPRETER RELEASES 184, 192 (1978).
In addition to proving a prima facie case of eligibility, the alien must also receive
a favorable exercise of discretion by the Attorney General or his representative.
See 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAw AND PROCEDURE § 7.9(e) (rev.
ed. 1979). Also, congressional ratification of the Attorney General's decision is
necessary for finalization of the suspension relief. See id. § 7.9(f) (3). See gener-
ally 57 INTERPRETER RELEASES 76, 77-79 (1980).
6. Compare I. & N. Act § 244(a) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1) (1976) with id.
§ 244(a) (2). Under § 244(a) (1) the alien must be "physically present in the United
States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding
the date of' application for suspension. Under § 244(a) (2), which applies to more
severe deportable misconduct, the minimum time period is "ten years immedi-
ately following the commission of an act, or the assumption of a status, constitut-
ing a ground for deportation... ." See generally Comment, Suspension of
Deportation: Illusory Relief, 14 SAN DIEGO T. REv. 229, 236-39 (1976).
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alien's physical presence. If a brief and temporary absence does
interrupt the alien's continuous physical presence, the alien can-
not prove the existence of an essential element of his prima facie
case of eligibility for relief. The result is that suspension of de-
portation is unavailable as a remedy in a deportation proceeding.
This specific issue was addressed in the recent decision of
Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS.7 Kamheangpatiyooth was lawfully
admitted to the United States as a student. Six years and eleven
months after his initial entry, he left the United States for a thirty
day trip to his native Thailand.8 The trip occurred during a se-
mester break from school, and his sole purpose was to visit his
critically ill mother. Prior to leaving, he obtained an INS form at-
testing to his enrollment at an American university. While in
Thailand he obtained a new student visa. Almost six years after
his return from this trip, the INS instituted deportation proceed-
ings. In the course of the proceedings Kamheangpatiyooth ap-
plied for suspension of deportation. The immigration judge held
that Kamheangpatiyooth failed to establish a prima facie case be-
cause his physical presence in the United States was not continu-
ous during the statutory period; therefore, suspension of
deportation was unavailable.9 The Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) affirmed.10 The Ninth Circuit reversed; its opinion focused
on the relationship between continuous physical presence and
hardship."
This Comment will analyze the continuous physical presence
element required for an alien's prima facie showing of eligibility
for suspension of deportation. A discussion of the important fac-
tors affecting physical presence and the effects of Kamheangpa-
tiyooth will be presented. Because modern courts have shown a
lenient attitude toward suspension applicants, this discretionary
remedy will become a revitalized relief for the alien.
7. 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979).
8. Had he stayed in the United States for a full seven years, he would have
been eligible for suspension relief. I. & N. Act § 244(a) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1)
(1976).
9. The Immigration and Naturalization Service sought to deport Kamhe-
angpatiyooth on the ground he stayed in the United States beyond his authorized
date. Since this ground is not "severe" deportable misconduct, the seven year pe-
riod for continuous physical presence applies. Id.
10. In re Kamheangpatiyooth, No. A-21322217 (BIA, Nov. 4, 1977).
11. 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979).
CONTINUOUS PHYSICAL PRESENCE PRIOR TO K-AMHEANGPATIYOOTH
In immigration law, the word "entry" is a term of art which
comprehends both the initial entry and any subsequent re-en-
try.12 The early case law strictly interpreted this term despite
harsh results to aliens.' 3 In United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith,14
the Supreme Court upheld an order deporting a resident alien
who re-entered the United States after a brief visit to Cuba,
notwithstanding the legality of his original entry and his twenty-
four year residency in the United States. The Court stated that
"'entry'... includes any coming of an alien from a foreign coun-
try into the United States whether such coming be the first or any
subsequent one."15
Most courts followed the strict definition of "entry" prescribed
in Volpe.16 However, in Di Pasquale v. Karnuth,1? the Second
Circuit rejected this rigid construction of "entry" as applied to a
resident alien who re-entered the United States during an over-
night train journey from Buffalo to Detroit via Canada. The court
held that deporting an alien, without proof that the alien actually
"knew [that he was leaving] or had any intention of leaving the
United States," would be irrational and capricious. 18
Shortly thereafter, in Delgadillo v. Carmichael,19 the Supreme
Court refined its definition of "entry." The Court held that a vol-
untary departure to, and return from, a foreign country was nec-
essary to constitute a re-entry. In Delgadillo, a resident alien
merchant seaman had embarked on an intercoastal voyage from
Los Angeles to New York City during World War H. En route, the
ship was torpedoed, and the alien "was catapulted into the ocean,
rescued, and taken to Cuba" for one week to recuperate.20
Clearly, the alien would not have made an "entry" nor would he
have been subject to deportation if the intercoastal voyage had
not been interrupted by an enemy ship. It was "the exigencies of
war, not his voluntary act, [that] put him on foreign soil."21
12. An "entry" is an event which interrupts an alien's continuous physical
presence.
13. See, e.g., Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291 (1914).
14. 289 U.S. 422 (1933).
15. Id. at 425.
16. See, e.g., Guarneri v. Kessler, 98 F.2d 580 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
648 (1938); Ward v. De Barros, 75 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1935); Taguchi v. Carr, 62 F.2d 307
(9th Cir. 1932); Zurbrick v. Borg, 47 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1931).
17. 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947). During the time the train traveled in Canada,
Di Pasquale was asleep. Id. at 878. Di Pasquale is contrary to Zurbrick v. Borg, 47
F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1931), which held an "entry" occurred under similar facts.
18. 158 F.2d at 879.
19. 332 U.S. 388 (1947).
20. Id. at 390.
21. Id. at 391.
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Therefore, the Court held that subjecting the alien to the harsh
consequences of deportation, under the circumstance of an invol-
untary departure, would be "too irrational" and "capricious" to
conform to the congressional purposes of the deportation provi-
sion.22
In light of Di Pasquale and Delgadillo, Congress defined "en-
try" in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act.23 As applied to
a returning alien who had a lawful permanent residence in the
United States, "entry" occurred only if the departure was in-
tended and voluntary.24 But, despite easily anticipated harsh re-
22. Id. In facts somewhat similar to Delgadillo, the Ninth Circuit held that an
alien returning to Seattle from seasonal cannery work in Alaska did not make an
entry when the vessel he was on made an unscheduled three-hour stop at Victo-
ria, British Columbia. Yoldo Chai v. Bonham, 165 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1947). In Car-
michael v. Delaney, 170 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1948), no entry occurred when an alien,
returning to the United States from wartime service as a merchant seaman, was
aboard a vessel which made several stops at foreign ports pursuant to Navy or-
ders.
A different example of an involuntary departure, resulting in no entry, is found
in In re Farmer, 14 I. & N. Dec. 737 (1974) (permanent resident alien's husband
bought a one-way ticket and placed her on a plane bound for Italy while she was
suffering from impaired mental capacity). See also In re Yam, 16 L & N. Dec. 535
(1978) (alien found floating in the Niagara River and brought to an American hos-
pital while unconscious made no entry because his crossing into the United States
was not voluntary).
23. The term "entry" means any coming of an alien into the United States,
from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether vol-
untary or otherwise, except that an alien having a lawful permanent resi-
dence in the United States shall not be regarded as making an entry into
the United States for the purposes of the immigration laws if the alien
proves to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that his departure to a
foreign port or place or to an outlying possession was not intended or rea-
sonably to be expected by him or his presence in a foreign port or place or
in an outlying possession was not voluntary: Provided, That no person
whose departure from the United States was occasioned by deportation
proceedings, extradition, or other legal process shall be held entitled to
such exception.
I. & N. Act § 101(a) (13), 8 U.S.C. § 11O1(a) (13) (1976).
24. Section 101(a) (13) defines the term "entry." Frequent reference is
made to the term "entry" in the immigration laws, and many conse-
quences relating to the entry and departure of aliens flow from its use, but
the term is not precisely defined in the present law. Normally an entry
occurs when the alien crosses the border of the United States and makes
a physical entry, and the question of whether an entry has been made is
susceptible of a precise determination. However, for the purposes of de-
termining the effect of a subsequent entry upon the status of an alien who
has previously entered the United States and resided therein, the precise-
ness of the term "entry" has not been found to be as apparent. Earlier ju-
dicial constructions of the term..., as set forth in Volpe v. Smith (289 U.S.
422 (1933)), generally held that the term "entry" included any coming of
an alien from a foreign country to the United States whether such coming
sults for some returning aliens, Congress refused to exclude from
the definition of "entry" an alien's return following a brief and
temporary absence.25 Eleven years later, the Supreme Court
broadly interpreted the term "entry" in the split decision of Ro-
senberg v. Fleuti.26 In its holding, the Supreme Court ignored the
desires of Congress and the apparently clear statutory definition
of "entry."27
Fleuti, a lawfully admitted resident alien, visited Mexico for a
few hours and then returned to the United States. Fleuti in-
tended (in the normal sense of the word) to travel into Mexico
and knew that he was crossing the international border. The
Court held, however, that this "innocent, casual; and brief' trip
was not an intended departure because it did not meaningfully in-
terrupt the alien's permanent residence.28 In addition to the brev-
ity, innocent purpose, and casual nature of the absence, the
Supreme Court recognized that other factors might be relevant to
the determination of a meaningful interruption.29
be the first or a subsequent one. More recently, the courts have departed
from the rigidity of that rule and have recognized that an alien does not
make an entry upon his return ... where he had no intent to leave the
United States [citing Di Pasquale], or did not leave the country volunta-
rily [citing Delgadillo 1. The bill defines the term "entry" as precisely as
practicable, giving due recognition to the judicial precedents. Thus any
coming of an alien ... into the United States is... an entry,... unless
... the departure.. ..from this country was unintentional or was not vol-
untary.
H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 32, S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4,
reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1683-84 (emphasis added).
25. The dissent in Rosenberg v. Fleuti stl-tdd that "numerous organizations un-
successfully urged that the definition [of entry] be" made more lenient so as to
exclude an alien's "return, after a temporary absence, to an unrelinquished domi-
cile" in the United States. 374 U.S. 449, 467 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) (discus-
sing Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary on S.
716, H.R. 2379, and H.R. 2816, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 143 (1951)).
26. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
27. Id. See Gordon, Recent Developments in Judicial Review of Immigration
Cases, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 18 (1977):
With characteristic severity, the sponsors of the McCarran-Walter Act [I.
& N. Act] sought to halt the development of a more rational principle by
defining entry as "any coming of an alien into the United States ... ,
whether voluntary or otherwise," unless he could establish that his depar-
ture or his presence in a foreign state was not voluntary. However, this
legislative effort to codify an unsound premise did not deter the Warren
Court from seeking to forge a more reasonable principle.
But see Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 468 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting). The
dissent indicated that the United States Supreme Court had already construed the
word "entry" after the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.
The dissent stated "that the word 'entry' retained its plain meaning, . . . 'a resi-
dent alien who leaves the country for any period, however brief, does make a new
entry on his return. . . .' Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691, 698 (1958)."
28. 374 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1963).
29. Id. at 462. The Court anticipated that these factors would be judicially de-
veloped by means of "the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion." Id.
[voL. 18: 65, 1980] Comments
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Most "entry" and "physical presence" decisions following Fleuti
and prior to Kamheangpatiyooth focused on the identification of
other factors relevant to a finding of a meaningfully interruptive
departure.30 One case in this period, Wadman v. INS,31 however,
while addressing relevant factors, merits special consideration for
other reasons. In Wadman, the Ninth Circuit stated that con-
tinuity of physical presence in the suspension of deportation con-
text was sufficiently analogous to the concept of "entry" and must
be determined with regard to the meaningful interruption guide-
line identified in Fleuti.32 The court also stated that a "liberal,"
not a "strict and technical" construction, was appropriate to re-
main consistent with the ameliorative purpose of the suspension
of deportation statute.33 Finally, the court held that Wadman's
five day visit to Mexico was not, as a matter of law, meaningfully
interruptive.3 4 Rather, the facts and circumstances of each spe-
cific case must support a finding of "meaningfully interruptive."35
JuDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF RELEVANT FACTORS
In "physical presence" and "entry" cases, the courts have
stressed the importance of certain factors to determine whether
an alien's departure was meaningfully interruptive.36 In Fleuti
the Supreme Court identified the three most important factors as
the length of the absence, the purpose of the trip, and the casual
nature of the trip.37 Subsequent cases amplified these three fac-
The importance of this broad, if not vague, language was to provide the immigra-
tion judges, Board of Immigration Appeals, and the federal circuit courts with the
flexibility necessary to decide future similar cases in a fair and lenient manner.
30. See, e.g., Mamanee v. INS, 566 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1977) (frequency of de-
partures); Munoz-Casarez v. INS, 511 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1975) (distance traveled);
Toon-Ming Wong v. INS, 363 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1966) (minority of the alien); Git
Foo Wong v. INS, 358 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1966) (legality of the original entry).
As mentioned previously, the concepts of entry and continuous physical pres-
ence are analogous. Therefore, the identification of a factor relevant to a finding of
a meaningfully interruptive departure in an "entry" case is also applicable in a
continuous physical presence case and vice versa.
31. 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964).
32. See id. at 815.
33. Id. at 816-17.
34. See id. at 816. Accord, Git Foo Wong v. INS, 358 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1966);
Zimmerman v. Lehmann, 339 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965).
35. 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964).
36. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963); Toon-Ming Wong v. INS,
363 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1966); Zimmerman v. Lehmann, 339 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965).
37. 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963).
tors and highlighted others.3 8 The presence or absence of these
factors individually or in combination may significantly affect ju-
dicial and administrative decision making.
Perhaps the most important factor is the length of the alien's
absence. Many of the early cases involved a few hours' stay in a
country contiguous to,39 or en route to,40 the United States. How-
ever, depending on the facts and circumstances of the specific
case, an absence of six months,41 or even sixteen months,42 may
be insufficient to break the continuity of an alien's physical pres-
ence. For example, if an alien is wrongfully seized and is pre-
vented from quickly returning to the United States, it may be
appropriate to find continuous physical presence despite the
lengthy absence.43 Although unusual facts may occasionally di-
minish the importance of this factor, the length of an alien's ab-
sence has generally retained its vitality in identifying a
meaningful interruption.44
A factor closely related to the length of the absence is the fre-
quency of absences.45 For example, the Seventh Circuit held that
an alien who departed three times for a total absence of seven
months over a two year period meaningfully interrupted his con-
tinuous physical presence, even though no one absence was suffi-
ciently long to break the continuity. 6 Generally, courts are more
sympathetic to an alien who has made only one departure during
his presence in the United States.47
In Fleuti, the Supreme Court required that the purpose of the
trip be innocent.48 Usually a pleasure trip or vacation,49 a trip to
38. See, e.g., Heitland v. INS, 551 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1977); Toon-Ming Wong v.
INS, 363 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1966); Zimmerman v. Lehmann, 339 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965).
39. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963) (Mexico); Zimmerman v.
Lehmann, 339 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965) (Canada).
40. Savoretti v. United States ex rel. Pincus, 214 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1954).
41. Toon-Ming Wong v. INS, 363 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1966).
42. McLeod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960). In McLeod, the court
stated that a "year's absence [normally] would be sufficient" to break the con-
tinuity of physical presence. Id. at 186. But because McLeod's absence was
caused solely by the misconduct of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
his lengthy absence would not interrupt his physical presence.
43. Id. at 186.
44. See, e.g., In re Salazar, I.D. No. 2741 (1979).
45. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 461 (1963).
46. Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1974).
47. See, e.g., Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 1979); In
re Karl, 10 I. & N. Dec. 480 (1964). Accord, Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091, 1092 (9th
Cir. 1974). See also In re Hoffman-Arvayo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 750 (1971).
48. 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963).
49. E.g., id.; Zimmerman v. Lehmann, 339 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 925 (1965); Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964); In re Yoo, 10 I. & N.
Dec. 376 (1963).
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visit family or friends (especially if they are ill),50 or a temporary
and bona fide business trip which enhances the alien's profes-
sional skills51 is considered innocent. Conversely, a trip with a
purpose which violates the laws or policies of the United States, 52
or which reflects a substantial probability that the alien might
never return,5 3 is generally disruptive of continuous physical
presence.
Dictum in Fleuti suggests that a trip is not innocent if the alien
has an improper purpose in mind when he departs from the
United States. 54 It is generally accepted, however, that the inno-
cent purpose of the departure may be destroyed if the alien for-
mulates and accomplishes an unlawful act during the absence.55
50. E.g., Chan v. INS, 610 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1979); Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS,
597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979); In re Quintanilla-Quintanilla, 11 I. & N. Dec. 432
(1965); In re Cardenas-Pinedo, 10 L & N. Dec. 341 (1963). But see Munoz-Caserez v.
INS, 511 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1975).
51. Itzcovitz v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 6, 447 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1971). See
also IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, REGULATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS 5242.11, 5242.12
(1977).
52. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963). Accord, Toon-Ming Wong v.
INS, 363 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1966); see Solis-Davila v. INS, 456 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1972)
(alien departed with the purpose of smuggling illegal aliens across the border); In
re Valdovinos, 14 L & N. Dec. 438 (1973) (smuggling aliens); In re Payan, 14 L & N.
Dec. 58 (1972) (providing fraudulent documents to enable Mexican aliens to ille-
gally cross the border). Cf. Bilbao-Bastida v. INS, 409 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.), cert. dis-
missed, 396 U.S. 802 (1969) (alien's pleasure trip to Cuba, a prohibited area,
considered to be a trip with a purpose contrary to the national policies reflected in
American immigration laws).
53. See Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073, 1079 (7th Cir. 1974) (alien departed
to marry a Columbian national who might insist on living in Columbia or who
might be excludable under American immigration laws).
54. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 461-63 (1963).
55. See Laredo-Miranda v. INS, 555 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1977); Cuevas-Cuevas v.
INS, 523 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1975) (resident alien knowingly assisted Mexican aliens
to cross the border illegally); Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1974) (resident
alien attempted to smuggle 55 pounds of untaxed marijuana across the Mexico-
United States border); In re Alvarez-Verduzco, 14 L & N. Dec. 625 (1966) (resident
alien departed with an innocent purpose, but attempted to re-enter the United
States with two grams of heroin purchased in Mexico). Cf. Longoria-Castaneda v.
INS, 548 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1977) (A resident alien, who intended to violate the im-
migration laws by knowingly transporting illegal aliens within the United States,
crossed into Mexico to eat lunch and to meet an accomplice; after failing to find
the accomplice, he returned to the United States and later participated in his part
of the improper plan. Held: the alien's re-entry was meaningfully interruptive).
But see Vargas-Banuelos v. INS, 466 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1972) (no meaningful inter-
ruption was caused by an unlawful act when the intent to commit the act was non-
existent at the time of departure). But cf. Yanez-Jacquez v. INS, 440 F.2d 701 (5th
Cir. 1971) (where a resident alien departed the United States With the intent to
Also, several circuits have held that an innocent purpose may be
lost if the alien misrepresents facts concerning his status to bor-
der officials when he attempts to re-enter the country.6
Usually the distance traveled by the alien depends on and is
therefore closely related to the purpose of the trip.57 Although
many early decisions reflected a harsh attitude toward aliens trav-
eling far from the United States, 58 modern courts recognize that
aliens generally travel no further than the purpose of their trip
necessitates. 59 As a matter of policy, the modern view is pre-
ferred. Assume two similarly situated aliens who simultaneously
depart from and return to the United States. Further assume that
the purpose of each departure was to visit family, and that each
traveled no further than necessary to reach his destination. It
would not be fair or logical to treat these aliens differently simply
because one alien's family lived only 100 miles from the United
States border and the family of the other alien lived 10,000 miles
away. Thus, the accepted view today is that travel to a distant
place does not conclusively break continuity of presence.
In Fleuti, the Supreme Court sought to avoid subjecting an
alien to the "unsuspected risks and unintended consequences" 60
of deportation stemming from a casual departure. The Court
stated that protecting an alien from the harsh consequences of
deportation was consonant with a "civilized application of our im-
migration laws."6 1 Conversely, if an alien has considered the full
implications of leaving the United States, including the increased
probability of deportation, then the risks and consequences can
be neither unsuspected nor unintended. The result is that the
commit a crime but never accomplished the criminal act, his purpose was inno-
cent).
56. Heitland v. INS, 551 F.2d 495, 502-04 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819
(1977) ("implicit misrepresentation" to border officials to secure re-entry);
Mamanee v. INS, 566 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1977); Bufalino v. INS, 473 F.2d 728,
731 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973); In re Kolk, 11 L & N. Dec. 103 (1965);
In re Karl, 10 I. & N. Dec. 480 (1964).
57. See Chan v. INS, 610 F.2d 651, 655 (9th Cir. 1979) (purpose was to visit fain-
fly and friends who lived in Hong Kong); Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d 1253,
1258 (9th Cir. 1979) (purpose was to visit critically ill mother who lived in Thai-
land).
58. See In re Janati-Ataie, 14 L & N. Dec. 216 (1972) (Iran); In re Guimares. 10
L & N. Dec. 529 (1964) (Portugal); but see Itzcovitz v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No.
6, 447 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1971) (Israel). See also Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 461
(1963). The Court referred to a trip where the alien "merely stepped across an in-
ternational border." Id. Actually, Fleuti's departure was to Ensenada, Mexico,
which is about 50 miles south of the United States border.
59. Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d at 1258: "His trip was limited ... in
distance as the exigencies that produced it-his mother's fatal illness at her home
in Thailand-permitted it to be."
60. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963).
61. Id.
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trip is not casual, but rather, meaningfully interruptive of the
alien's continuous physical presence. A meaningfully interruptive
trip, caused by an alien's recognition and appreciation of the im-
plications of departing, normally would be manifested by the pro-
curement of travel documents, 62 or possibly by making formal
arrangements to stay for a significant duration in the foreign
country.6 3
In Itzcovitz v. Selective Service Local Board No. 6,64 the Second
Circuit lessened the importance of the "casual" factor. Before his
departure, Itzcovitz sought and obtained a declaratory judgment
enabling him to re-enter the United States following an antici-
pated three week absence.65 Had he left the United States with-
out obtaining this declaratory relief, the INS would have
prohibited his re-entry.66 Because he sought judicial protection
prior to his departure, the obvious conclusion was that he fully
considered the risks and consequences of leaving the United
States. Such consideration normally would have rendered the ab-
sence meaningfully interruptive and would have destroyed his eli-
gibility for suspension of deportation. The court, recognizing that
Itzcovitz faced a dilemma, logically and fairly resolved the prob-
lem by holding that his absence would not be meaningfully inter-
ruptive.67
In Kamheangpatiyooth, the Ninth Circuit discussed the casual
factor in light of Fleuti and Itzcovitz. The court stated that "the
arrangements made by an alien prior to departure, including doc-
umentation obtained, may confirm the essential continuity of his
presence in this country and the lack of any reasonable basis for
anticipating that the planned absence might imperil his status."68
Thus, pre-departure conduct may clearly demonstrate an alien's
intent that his trip is not to adversely affect his status in the
62. See id.; Heitland v. INS, 551 F.2d 497, 501 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819
(1977).
63. See Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091, 1092 (9th Cir. 1974).
64. 447 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1971).
65. Id. at 889.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 597 F.2d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 1979). In prior cases, obtaining travel docu-
ments normally indicated that the alien had considered the full implications of his
departure. But in Kamheangpatiyooth, the court took an opposite tack and stated
that obtaining travel documents may indicate the alien's intent to maintain a con-
tinued physical presence in the United States. Id.
United States.69
Deportation would be particularly harsh for an alien who has
established firm roots in the United States. Indeed, the suspen-
sion of deportation provision "was not designed to protect the
wanderers or the rootless." 70 When an alien's departure to a for-
eign country "uproots" his ties to the United States, continuity of
physical presence is destroyed. 71 For example, the Ninth Circuit
held that when an alien and his entire family departed the United
States, physical presence was meaningfully interrupted.72
On the other hand, long-term maintenance of a United States
residence or legal resident status;73 the American citizenship of
the alien's dependent spouse,74 children,75 or parents;76 the alien's
residence or business property in the United States; 77 the alien's
employment in the United States;7 8 the alien's prior honorable
military service to the United States;79 and the alien's intent to re-
69. Id.
70. Heitland v. INS, 551 F.2d 495, 501 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977).
71. See In re Nakoi, 14 L & N. Dec. 208 (1972) (alien accepted a nine month
teaching contract at a Canadian university for a considerable salary); In re Tafoya-
Gutierrez, 13 L & N. Dec. 342 (1969).
72. Mamanee v. INS, 566 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1977). Cf. Chan v. INS, 610 F.2d
651 (9th Cir. 1979). The same court held that a trip, where only the alien departed
while the spouse remained in the United States, was not meaningfully interrup-
tive.
73. See Zimmerman v. Lehmann, 339 F.2d 943, 948 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 925 (1965) (39 years).
74. See id.
75. See id.; but see Heitland v. INS, 551 F.2d 497 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
819 (1977) (birth of an alien's child'in the United States, which provides American
citizenship for the child, is usually insufficient "roots," especially if the parents are
in the United States illegally).
76. See Chan v. INS, 610 F.2d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1979).
77. See Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (7th Cir. 1974); Zimmerman
v. Lehman, 339 F.2d 943, 949 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965).
78. See Gordon, Recent Developments in Judicial Review of Immigration
Cases, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 19 (1977).
79. See Git Foo Wong v. INS, 358 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1966). Wong had honorably
served in the United States Army for one year, eleven months, and twenty-three
days. Had he served for a full two years, continuous physical presence would have
been waived as a requirement for suspension of deportation eligibility. See L & N.
Act § 244(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b) (1976). However, in finding continuous physical
presence, the Court appeared to act more generously with the alien United States
Army veteran. Cf. Itzcovitz v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 6, 447 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.
1971) (resident alien, who was an Argentine national, claimed his treaty right of
exemption from induction into the United States military service; as a result, the
INS eagerly sought to exclude Itzcovitz twice). See also In re M, 3 L & N. Dec. 249
(1948); In re W, 2 L & N. Dec. 899 (1947).
Cf. In re J.M.D., 7 L & N. Dec. 105 (1956) (alien's absence to a foreign country, if
caused by active duty in the United States armed services, does not break the con-
tinuity of the alien's physical presence; rather, the time spent overseas is regarded
as time physically present in the United States).
See also L & N. Act § 244(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b) (1976). The issue of "entry" or
whether a brief departure meaningfully interrupts an alien's physical presence is
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tain his American residence8O are indicative that the alien has est-
ablished firm "roots" in American soil. The establishment of roots
in and the personal commitment to American society legitimizes
the inference that deportation would be unduly harsh and con-
trary to the legislative purpose of the suspension of deportation
provision.81
In the early administrative decisions, an alien's petition for sus-
pension of deportation was rejected if his original entry was un-
lawful.82 These cases stressed that section 101 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act defined entry as "any coming of an alien."8 3
However, section 101 also provided that no "entry" occurred fol-
lowing an involuntary or unintended departure.84 This exception
was narrowly construed to apply only to aliens having lawful per-
manent resident status.85 The early decisions narrowly limited
the Fleuti doctrine to cases involving lawful permanent resident
aliens because Fleuti was concerned solely with the unintended
departure of a lawful resident alien. Thus, Fleuti provided no re-
lief to an alien who originally entered the United States illegally.
moot if the alien complies with this section. The requirements are: the alien must
have served at least twenty-four months in the armed services; if he is separated
from the service, he must have been honorably discharged; and the alien must
have been in the United States at the time of enlistment or induction into the
service.
80. Heitland v. INS, 551 F.2d 495, 501 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977);
Munoz-Caserez v. INS, 511 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1975). Lack of an intent to abandon
resident status wilI not necessarily bar a finding of meaningful interruption. Id.;
In re Nakoi, 14 I. & N. Dec. 208 (1972) ("intent to abandon permanent residence
status" is not synonymous with "intent to depart in a meaningfully interruptive
manner"); In re Guimares, 10 I. & N. Dec. 529 (1964) (in determining whether an
"entry" has been made following a temporary absence, the alien's intent to main-
tain a United States residence is not decisive, but only one factor for the court to
consider). However, the alien's intent to retain his residence in the United States
has been significant in several cases. See, e.g., Zimmerman V. Lehmann, 339 F.2d
943, 949 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965).
Some courts have suggested that an alien's departure during the narrow time
period of a school semester break indicates the alien's intent to return. See, e.g.,
Chan v. INS, 610 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1979); Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d 1253
(9th Cir. 1979).
81. Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d 1253, 1256 (9th Cir. 1979). See also
Heitland v. INS, 551 F.2d 495, 505 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977) (Kauf-
man, C.J., dissenting).
82. See In re Jacobson, 10 I. & N. Dec. 782 (1964); In re Wong, 10 L & N. Dec. 513
(1964).
83. I. & N. Act § 101(a) (13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (13) (1976).
84. Id.
85. See In re Jacobson, 10 L & N. Dec. 782 (1964); In re Wong, 10 I. & N. Dec. 513
(1964).
It was not until Wadman that a court of appeals demanded a
"liberal" rather than a "strict and technical construction" of the
section 101 entry definition.86 But despite Wadman, an alien who
illegally entered the United States received little benefit from the
suspension of deportation provision until the case of Git Foo
Wong v. INS.87 In Git Foo Wong, the Ninth Circuit held that the
illegality of the alien's original entry was immaterial to a finding
of continuous physical presence. 88 The BIA ultimately acceded to
this view.89
If the illegality of the alien's original entry is immaterial to con-
tinuous physical presence, then the illegality of the alien's pres-
ence in the United States just prior to his departure should be
immaterial also. However, in Heitland v. INS,90 the Second Cir-
cuit suggested a contrary view. The court stated that because of
their illegal presence prior to departure, the aliens had no reason-
able expectation that the government would permit them to re-
enter and remain in the United States.9' Absent a legal right to
stay in the United States or a reasonable expectation of re-entry,
the alien probably must resort to misrepresentation of facts to
border officials which taints the innocence of his departure.92
86. 329 F.2d 812, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1964).
87. 358 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1966).
88. Id. The usual fact pattern where the illegality of the original entry is at
issue is as follows: the alien illegally enters; he resides in the United States for
the statutorily required time period; during this period, he temporarily and briefly
departs from the United States; he returns and resumes his presence in the
United States; deportation proceedings ensue; and the alien attempts to show con-
tinuous physical presence as an element of his prima facie case of eligibility for
suspension of deportation relief. See id.
89. See In re Wong, 12 I. & N. Dec. 271 (1967) (superseding In re Jacobson, 10 L
& N. Dec. 782 (1964) and In re Wong, 10 I. & N. Dec. 513 (1964)); 2 C. GORDON & .
RoSENRFELD, MIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.9(d), 7-147 n.85 (rev. ed. 1979).
90. 551 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977). Heitland presented
a rare set of facts. The Heitlands legally entered the United States in 1968 on a six
month non-immigrant visa. They illegally remained in the United States after
their visa expired. In 1970, they took a six week trip to Germany with full knowl-
edge they were illegally present in the United States at the time of their depar-
ture. To gain re-entry into the United States, they used implicitly deceitful tactics.
In 1971, about three years after the Heitlands' original entry, the INS initituted de-
portation proceedings. From 1971 until 1975, the Heitlands and the INS were en-
tangled in deportation proceedings. In 1975, following their seven year stay in the
United States, the Heitlands sought suspension of deportation. Id. at 502.
See also In re Graham, 11 L & N. Dec. 234 (1965). The facts of Graham are some-
what similar to Heitland in that Graham's original entry was legal. In contrast
with Heitland though, Graham briefly departed from the United States during a
period when she had lawful nonimmigrant student status. Upon her return, she
retained her lawful status. Five years later, after her authorized date expired, the
INS instituted deportation proceedings. Despite facts favorable to Graham, she
was ordered to deport because she never was lawfully admitted for permanent
resident status. See note 80 supra.
91. 551 F.2d at 502.
92. See id.; cf. In re Maldonado-Sandoval, 14 L & N. Dec. 475 (1973). In Maldo-
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The purpose of the suspension provision is to provide discre-
tionary relief to deserving, but deportable aliens. To distinguish
between an illegal original entry and an illegal presence just prior
to departure results in logically incongruous holdings.9 3 To ex-
clude an alien who was illegally present just prior to a non-mean-
ingfully interruptive departure, or to deport him because he is
forced by immigration laws and policies to use deceitful tactics to
re-enter, frustrates the ameliorative purpose of the suspension
provision and contravenes the Supreme Court's holding in Fleuti.
The Supreme Court should resolve this issue94 by ruling that if
the alien makes a non-meaningfully interruptive departure, the il-
legality of his original entry or of his presence prior to departure
is irrelevant to a finding of continuous physical presence.9 5
nado-Sandoval the alien's original entry was fraudulent, and therefore, his pres-
ence prior to a brief departure was unlawful. When he attempted to return, he
was excluded because he had no right to re-enter. Because an alien subject to ex-
clusion has fewer rights and remedies (including suspension of deportation) than
one subject to deportation, an alien might be well advised to gain entry by
whatever means necessary to avoid exclusion and to risk deportation.
93. See Griffith, Exclusion and Deportation: Some Avenues of Relief for the
Alien, 15 SAx DIEGO L. REv. 79, 100 (1977):
Perhaps the court in Heitland placed too much emphasis on . . . the
alien's ... illegal presence in the United States. In doing so, it impliedly
created a distinction for purposes of section 244 relief between an alien
who is legally within the United States and one who is not. It is suggested
that this distinction should be left to the Attorney General's discretion in
each particular case, and that it ought not to be regarded as a disqualify-
ing feature with respect to an alien's application under that section ....
It is submitted, therefore, that an alien should still be eligible for consider-
ation even though his original entry (or his presence prior to departure)
was illegal .... The alien who most needs section 244 protection is the
alien who is enduring illegal status in the United States but at the same
time has cultivated relationships that would render it extremely difficult
for him to sever his ties here.
94. To the extent Heitland is inconsistent with this proposed rule, it should be
overruled.
95. Past decisions have suggested that other factors are relevant. See Toon-
Ming Wong v. INS, 363 F.2d 234, 236 (9th- Cir. 1966) (alien's age). When an alien
minor departs from the United States, the court must inquire whether it is the mi-
nor's intent or that of his parent or guardian which is predominant. Generally, "an
unemancipated minor [alien], under the custody and control of his parents (or
guardian)," without a choice as to his departure, does not meaningfully interrupt
his continued physical presence when he leaves the United States pursuant to his
parent's decision. Id.; see also United States ex rel. Valenti v. Karnuth, 1 F. Supp.
370 (N.D.N.Y. 1932); In re Bauer, 10 L & N. Dec. 304 (1963).
See Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1974) ("the nature of the
environment to which [the alien] would be deported, and his relation to that envi-
ronment"); Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091, 1092 (9th Cir. 1974) (court concerned
THE EFFECTS OF KAMHEANGPATiYooTH
A New Focus on Factors
Prior to Kamheangpatiyooth, courts focused on the identifica-
tion of factors relevant to finding a meaningfully interruptive ab-
sence. In Kamheangpatiyooth the Ninth Circuit altered the focus
on "factors" in two ways. First, the court emphatically stated that
the legal objective is to determine whether an absence is mean-
ingfully interruptive of the alien's continuous physical presence. 96
The existence or nonexistence of particular factors is merely evi-
dentiary and is not conclusive on ineligibility for suspension re-
lief.97 It is the cumulative effect of all relevant factors which is
determinative and which must be considered.
Second, the court emphasized the importance of considering
the hardship to the alien in determining meaningful interruption
of continuous physical presence.98 The court stressed the reme-
dial legislative purpose of the suspension of deportation provi-
sion.99 The court recognized that the provision was designed to
relieve aliens of the harsh results, unexpected risks, and unin-
tended consequences that would stem from a strict interpretation
and application of deportation provisions. 0 0 When an alien has
developed a sufficient loyalty and commitment to the United
States by virtue of his lengthy physical presence, deportation
would harshly uproot the resident and destroy his dreams and ex-
with deporting the alien to communist Bulgaria where he would be deprived of
personal freedoms enjoyed in the United States).
Also, the reason for deportation has affected physical presence in some cases.
For example, the courts appear to treat aliens guilty of relatively minor deportable
misconduct more leniently than aliens guilty of severe deportable misconduct.
Compare Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979) (alien remained
in the United States beyond his authorized date) and Pimental-Navarro v. Del
Guercio, 256 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1958) (due to economic stress, alien transported an
illegal alien across the border; although declaring the alien ineligible for suspen-
sion relief, the court noted "the trifling nature of the offense," and remanded for
further consideration of alternative discretionary relief in light of the severe hard-
ship to the alien and his family) with Munoz-Caserez v. INS, 511 F.2d 947 (9th Cir.
1975) (alien convicted of manslaughter) and In re Abi-Richard, 10 I. & N. Dec. 551
(1964) (voluntary manslaughter).
96. 597 F.2d at 1257-58.
97. Id.; cf. Cuevas-Cuevas v. INS, 523 F.2d 883, 885 (9th Cir. 1975) (Browning,
J., concurring): "Controlling weight should not be given to only one of several fac-
tors."
98. 597 F.2d at 1256. For an alien to make a prima facie case of eligibility for
suspension of deportation relief, he must prove "extreme hardship" or "excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship" depending on whether § 244(a) (1) or
§ 244(a) (2) applies. See note 5 supra. However, the court distinguished hardship
as an element of the prima facie case from hardship as afactor in determining a
meaningful interruption in continuous physical presence.
99. 597 F.2d at 1256 n.4.
100. 597 F.2d at 1256.
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pectations for a continued life in America.' 0 ' The court stated
that continuity of physical presence is important to a legitimate
inference that deportation would be unduly harsh.02 By empha-
sizing hardship, the court catapulted this factor in importance and
comparatively weakened the other factors relevant to an alien's
prima facie case of eligibility.
A New Legal Standard
In addition to restating the Wadman admonition that "mean-
ingful interruption" must be generously construed in favor of the
alien,103 the Ninth Circuit created a new standard for determining
whether an alien's absence is meaningfully interruptive. 04 The
court rejected the vague "Fleuti test" that emphasized the brev-
ity, innocent purpose, and casual nature of the absence. 0 5 The
court stated that the immigration judge or the BIA
must determine whether a particular absence during the seven-year pe-
riod reduced the significance of the whole period as reflective of the hard-
ship and unexpectedness of expulsion. An absence cannot be significant
or meaningfully interruptive of the whole period if indications are that the
hardship of deportation to the alien would be equally severe had the ab-
sence not occurred, and that no significant increase in the likelihood of de-
portation could reasonably have been expected to flow from the manner
and circumstances surrounding the absence.' 0 6
Thus, to be meaningfully interruptive of continuous physical pres-
ence, the absence itself must have diminished the potential hard-
ship to the alien by virtue of the alien's reasonable expectation of
an increase in the probability of deportation. 0 7 If the alien could
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The standard to determine continuous physical presence, which is
only one element of the alien's prima facie case for eligibility, logically should be
generous to the alien because the effect of a liberal standard is not to automati-
cally grant suspension relief but merely to permit the Attorney General to review
the case on its merits. If the alien's case is unworthy of a favorable exercise of
discretion, the Attorney General would not grant the remedy nor would Congress
ratify the suspension request. See Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 816-17 (9th Cir.
1964).
104. Since the BIA and the immigration judge used the incorrect legal stan-
dard, the case was remanded for redetermination. Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597
F.2d at 1260.
105. Id. at 1257.
106. Id.
107. As to the alien's reasonable expectations of deportability stemming from
the absence, the court failed to state whether an objective or subjective test
should apply. In other words, should the governing expectation be that of the
"reasonable and ordinary alien" or that of the alien subject to deportation in the
not have anticipated the increased likelihood of deportation as a
result of the absence, then the severity of hardship to the alien
would be equal to the severity of hardship had the alien remained
within the United States during the entire statutory period for
continuous physical presence.'0 8
Prospective Effects
In the past, courts frequently failed to clearly analyze and artic-
ulate those factors that were most important to the holding of the
case. 109 But in Kamheangpatiyooth, the court clearly stressed
hardship as the primary factor. This emphasis should encourage
other courts to pinpoint those factors whose cumulative effect
supports the finding regarding continuous physical presence.
By stressing the importance of hardship as a factor and by cre-
ating a new standard which correlates hardship to a finding of
meaningful interruption, the Ninth Circuit made it much easier
for an alien seeking suspension relief to prove the continuous
physical presence element of his prima facie case. Because of the
court's lenient attitude toward hardship as a factor in continuous
physical presence, it is highly probable that this attitude of leni-
ency also will affect the extreme hardship element of the alien's
prima facie case.110
specific case? Because of the court's usage of the words "reasonably . . . ex-
pected," future courts probably would opt for an objective test.
108. See id.
[I]nterruptions that are brief and infrequent do not diminish the
probability that deportation would occasion undue hardship. An alien
who leaves the country briefly and for innocent reasons during the requi-
site seven years may be in no different position, realistically viewed, than
an alien who has remained within the borders for an identical period.
Id. Compare Heitland v. INS, 551 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819
(1977), where the court stated:
[TJo deny a person the benefits of seven years' continuous residence be-
cause of one or two short interruptions might well defeat the purpose of
[the suspension of deportation statute], since the hardship in such case
would not be substantially different from that where the presence has
been uninterrupted.
Id. at 501.
109. See generally Comment, Exclusion and Deportation of Resident Aliens:
The Re-entry Doctrine and the Need for Reform, 13 SAN DrExo L. REV. 192, 200-06
(1975).
110. Because the BIA applied an improper standard in denying Kamheangpa-
tiyooth's petition for suspension of deportation, the court of appeals vacated the
decision and remanded the case for a redetermination based on the correct stan-
dard. 597 F.2d at 1260. On remand, the legal argument focused on the extreme
hardship element of a prima facie case for eligibility; the question of good morals
could be settled as a factual matter. The continuous physical presence issue was
apparently conceded to the applicant by virtue of the prior court of appeal holding.
Whether the Ninth Circuit's decision will affect the determination concerning ex-
treme hardship remains to be seen.
[VOL. 18: 65, 1980] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAWN REVIEW
Kamheangpatiyooth may ease the alien's burden of establish-
ing a prima facie case of eligibility for suspension of deportation
relief. Will it also impact the Attorney General's exercise of dis-
cretion in a manner favorable to the alien?' The law is well es-
tablished that suspension of deportation is a matter of discretion
and administrative grace." 2 Congress specifically granted the au-
thority and responsibility of exercising discretion to the Attorney
General (or his representative, the immigration judge).113 Nor-
mally, courts will not substitute their discretion for that of the At-
torney General.114 However, limited judicial review will follow
when the Attorney General fails to exercise discretion, or the fair-
ness of the procedure is challenged, or an abuse of discretion is
alleged." 5
Once an alien establishes a prima facie case of eligibility, he is
entitled to have his application for relief considered as a matter of
right." 6 But if an alien fails to show eligibility, the Attorney Gen-
eral need not exercise discretion. If the Attorney General applies
an erroneous legal standard in rejecting an alien's claim of eligi-
bility and therefore fails to exercise discretion, a reviewing
body117 will reject this findingil8 and remand the case for a rede-
termination of eligibility based on the correct standard. This pro-
cess occurred in Kamheangpatiyooth. The Ninth Circuit created
and applied a new legal standard regarding continuous physical
111. See note 5 supra.
112. United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72 (1957); L & N.
Act § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976).
113. Although the statute charges the Attorney General with discretionary re-
sponsibilities, I. & N. Act § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976), the Attorney General
delegates this responsibility to the immigration judge. It is the immigration judge
who hears the evidence, determines whether a prima facie case of eligibility ex-
ists, and if so, grants or denies the requested suspension relief. This process is
subject to review by the BIA, and ultimately by the federal courts. See generally
Roberts, The Exercise of Administrative Discretion Under the Immigration Laws,
13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 144, 147 (1975).
114. See, e.g., Melachrinos v. Brownell, 230 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Kaloudis v.
Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1950).
115. See 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE,
§§ 8.15, 8-96 to 8-105 (rev. ed. 1979).
116. McLeod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960). It is error for the Attorney
General to fail to exercise discretion once the applicant has made a prima facie
case. E.g., Asimakopoulos v. INS, 445 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1971); Kam Ng v. Pilliod,
279 F.2d 207 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 860 (1961).
117. See 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMIIGRATION LAV AND PROCEDURE,
§ 8.15, 8-96 to 8-105 (rev. ed. 1979).
118. See McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162 (1950).
presence." 9 It is likely that to effectuate a trend of leniency to-
ward aliens other new standards will be created regarding the
hardship or good morals elements of a prima facie case.
A reviewing body may also reject the Attorney General's find-
ing of fact. For example, on the issue of hardship, a court could
leave the legal standard unchanged and simply find that the facts
show the requisite degree of hardship. However, unless the find-
ing of fact was arbitrary and without a reasonable basis of sup-
port, courts should not interfere with the fact finding function of
the Attorney General.120
As stated previously, once an alien shows eligibility, the Attor-
ney General must exercise discretion. But, an alien is not enti-
tled to an automatic, favorable exercise of discretion.121 When an
alien is denied relief, he may challenge such denial on the
grounds of unfair procedure122 or abuse of discretion.123
The standard of review for exercises of administrative discre-
tion is usually couched in ambiguous terms and is incapable of
precise definition.124 Generally, a clear showing of abuse of dis-
cretion occurs if the exercise of discretion by the Attorney Gen-
eral is "arbitrary or capricious.'U125 In properly exercising
discretion, the immigration judge must consider the relevant fac-
tors in each case.126 But because there is considerable similarity
between the factors pertinent to the elements of a prima facie
case, and the factors relevant to a proper exercise of discretion,127
the court's emphasis on hardship in Kamheangpatiyooth may ul-
119. See Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d at 1257.
120. 2 C. GORDON & H. R OSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 8.15a,
8-97 (rev. ed. 1979).
The Attorney General may not exclude from eligibility classes of aliens deter-
mined by arbitrary categories. Creation of such classes would be deemed a failure
to exercise discretion. Although the Attorney General may create general stan-
dards and guidelines, each claim of eligibility must be reviewed on its own merits.
Id.
121. See, e.g., United States ex reL. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72
(1957).
122. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). The
general rule is that the procedure must be fair and reasonable.
123. See Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1966).
124. See Roberts, The Exercise ofAdministrative Discretion Under the Immigra-
tion Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 144, 158 (1975).
125. Kam Ng v. Pilliod, 279 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 860
(1961). An abuse of discretion occurs if the administrative decision without a "ra-
tional explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an
impermissible basis such as an invidious discrimination against a particular race
or group," or on other considerations that Congress could not have intended to
make relevant. Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1966).
126. See 2 C. GORDON & H. RosENrmLD, IMMIGRATION LAw AND PROCEDURE
§ 7.9(e), 7-166 to 7-170 (rev. ed. 1979).
127. Id.
[voL. 18: 65, 1980] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
timately affect the immigration judge's exercise of discretion. In
future cases, the immigration judge should be more inclined to
grant suspension of deportation when the applicant makes a
strong showing of hardship.
The BIA and the courts of appeals may subsequently review
the determination by the immigration judge. 28 Although the
Ninth Circuit has professed a new,'lenient standard of meaningful
interruption and emphasized the hardship factor, it remains to be
seen how the other reviewing bodies will respond to Kamhe-
angpatiyooth. Except for those areas of the Northern and West-
ern Regions of the BIA which are under the Ninth Circuit's
jurisdiction, the reviewing bodies are not obligated to follow the
Kamheangpatiyooth precedent. However, Ninth Circuit immigra-
tion decisions are important because a majority of the deportable
aliens enter and reside within the jurisdictional boundaries of the
Ninth Circuit.29 Additionally, because the well reasoned opinion
in Kamheangpatiyooth better effectuates the ameliorative pur-
pose of the suspension of deportation statute, other reviewing
bodies should follow the Ninth Circuit's lead.
Even if other reviewing bodies follow the lenient but logical
holding in Kamheangpatiyooth, the ameliorative purpose of the
suspension provision may nevertheless be frustrated. Believing
that the arbitrary and capricious standard may be a shield from
penetrating judicial review, immigration judges may be reluctant
to exercise discretion consistently with the logic of Kamheangpa-
tiyooth. To prevent the immigration judges from circumventing
judicial standards, reviewing bodies should take the following
course of action.
First, reviewing bodies should require written statements from
immigration judges which articulate the facts and reasons sup-
porting a particular exercise of discretion. 30 An alien may have
128. Since both the BIA and the federal courts may review the exercise of dis-
cretion, these two "reviewing bodies" will be discussed together in the text
129. See, e.g., 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 373-86 (1979) (immigration statistics for
1977); 55 INTERPRETER RELEASES 171-83 (1978) (immigration statistics for 1976).
130. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598
(D.C. Cir. 1971): "Courts should require administrative officers to articulate the
standards and principles that govern their discretionary decisions in as much de-
tail as possible." See also 2 K. DAVIS, ADmmNISTRATrVE LAW TREATISE § 8.2 (2d ed.
1979). An articulated statement is especially needed when an alien's request for
suspension is denied. But to provide guidance for future exercises of discretion,
articulated statements should be made whether relief is denied or granted.
unique facts and circumstances surrounding his request for sus-
pension relief which merit individualized consideration. Thus,
immigration judges must retain the essential flexibility needed to
perform those discretionary responsibilities mandated by Con-
gress.'3 ' However, requiring immigration judges to articulate the
facts and reasons supporting an exercise of discretion would not
be a harmful intrusion upon the needed flexibility. Rather,
thoughtful consideration and articulation will improve the quality
of discretion. 32
Second, reviewing bodies should provide clear guidelines to
"structure" INS discretion.133 "A main way to structure discretion
is through stating findings and reasons and following prece-
dents." 3 4 By developing a body of well reasoned and published
opinions, reviewing bodies will provide immigration judges with a
framework for determining proper exercises of discretion. Re-
viewing bodies should not render the congressional grant of dis-
cretionary authority meaningless by substituting their own
discretion for that of the INS. 35 But where guiding standards are
vague, ambiguous, or nonexistent, or where they need to be
changed to better effectuate the legislative purpose of ameliorat-
ing undue hardship,136 reviewing bodies should intercede.137
Because of the expansive interpretation of a statutory provision
131. L & N. Act § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976). See, e.g., Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363
U.S. 405 (1960).
132. Quality of discretion comprehends concepts such as fairness to the alien,
effectuating congressional purposes, and consistency and predictability in decision
making.
133. See K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 8.9, 8.10 (2d ed. 1979). By
publishing reasoned opinions and treating them as binding, the INS can partially
resolve its problem of unstructured discretion. In discussing the discretionary
remedy of adjustment of status under L & N. Act § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976), Pro-
fessor Davis quotes Recommendation 71-5 of the Administrative Conference which
states that "when neither rules nor standards provide effective guidance for the
exercise of discretion... Section 245 decisions should be reached upon the basis
... of precedents established by the [immigration judges] themselves." Id. § 8.10,
at 204. But where the INS has inadequately provided a guideline to structure dis-
cretion, see id., reviewing bodies should assume this responsibility. Since few im-
migration judge opinions and only selected BIA opinions are available for use as
precedents, the courts should take a more active role in structuring INS discretion.
See id. § 8.4, at 170. See generally Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretion-
ary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 CoLum. L. REv. 1293, 1295, 1314 (1972).
134. 2 K. DAVIS, ADmiNSTRATvE LAW TREATISE § 8.4, at 169 (2d ed. 1979).
135. See note 114 supra.
136. See, e.g., Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d 1253, 1256 (9th Cir. 1979);
Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964).
137. As the courts become more involved in structuring INS discretion, incon-
sistent exercises of discretion will be minimized. Citing several sources, one com-
mentator stated "that inconsistency is at the very core of arbitrariness; that
uniformity is a crucial component of justice." Sofaer, Judicial Control ofInformal
Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L REV. 1293, 1350 (1972).
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in Kamheangpatiyooth, Congress may respond by amending the
immigration laws. However, this is unlikely for several reasons.
First, legislators and immigration commentators both recognize
the need for a comprehensive reformation of American immigra-
tion law;138 a piecemeal approach will not resolve the many immi-
gration problems. Secondly, the Ninth Circuit stressed the
consistency of its holding in Kamheangpatiyooth with the legisla-
tive purpose behind the suspension of deportation provision.139 If
the Court's view is correct and Kamheangpatiyooth reflects the
current congressional attitude, there is no need to amend the stat-
ute.14o Finally, Congress can tolerate lenient administrative and
judicial attitudes toward aliens seeking suspension of deportation
because it has the final approval of each grant of suspension relief
via the ratification process.' 4 '
CONCLUSION
The far reaching Kamheangpatiyooth decision rejuvenated the
ameliorative purpose of the suspension of deportation provision.
The decision evidences a lenient attitude toward deserving, de-
portable aliens. After Kamheangpatiyooth, the alien will be able
to prove more easily both the continuous physical presence and
the extreme hardship elements of his prima facie case of eligibil-
ity. Also, the administrative and judicial decision makers are en-
couraged to carefully analyze in each case the evidentiary factors
that are important to a determination consistent with the amelio-
138. See Castillo, Introduction, 15 SAN DIEGO L REV. 5, 8 (1977); Eilberg, Fore-
word, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 3, 8 (1978); Gordon, The Need to Modernize Our Im-
migration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1975); Rodino, Foreword, 13 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. i (1975).
139. 597 F.2d at 1257.
140. A perfect example of this proposition is stated in Itzcovitz v. Selective
Serv. Local Bd. No. 6, 447 F.2d 888, 894 (2d Cir. 1971): "Statutory interpretation has
been made a little easier since Congress has had the gloss of Fleuti before it for
seven years [by now it has been almost 17 years] without tightening subsection
(13) of the statute [the definitional provision regarding "entry"] or indeed chang-
ing it, even while changing provision after provision of subdivision (a) of § 101."
Even though the dissent in Fleuti may have correctly analyzed the legislative his-
torj and purpose and properly construed the language of the statute, see 374 U.S.
at 462-68 (Clark, J., dissenting), the majority apparently construed the statute in a
manner consistent with the then prevailing desires of Congress. This conclusion
is indicated by the failure of Congress to statutorily amend the Fleuti decision. If
Kamheangpatiyooth is harmonious With the currently prevailing congressional at-
titude, then an amendment to modify the court decision is unlikely.
141. See L & N. Act § 244(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (1976).
rative purpose of the statute. The Attorney General, the Board of
Immigration Appeals, and other circuit courts of appeals will be
influenced significantly by this decision. This influence probably
will be manifested by greater leniency toward aliens seeking sus-
pension of deportation relief. Since it is unlikely that Congress
will statutorily reject Kamheangpatiyooth, the effects of the deci-
sion should be longstanding.
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